We develop and estimate a dynamic heterogeneous agent model for the EMS period. Our empirical results suggest that the existence of heterogeneous interacting agents is indeed a possible explanation for the dynamics of exchange rates during the EMS; we find strong evidence in favor of our model using in-and out-of-sample tests. Moreover, we show that the heterogeneous agent model outperforms the random walk in out-of-sample forecasting in all country/period combinations. Finally, we study the dynamic limit properties of the estimated non-linear system.
Introduction
The exchange rate models that emerged in response to the breakdown of Bretton Woods fixed-parity system in the early 1970s are without exception based on the notion of rational expectations (Muth, 1961) and a representative agent. It is increasingly evident, however, that traditional exchange rate modeling based on the efficient market rational expectations paradigm is rejected by the data.
1 Several empirical anomalies have been uncovered over the years. One of the most widely stated empirical anomaly relates to the existence of the exchange rate disconnect puzzle, i.e. the exchange rate appears to be disconnected from its underlying fundamental process. For instance, the findings of Goodhart (1989) and more recently Faust et al (2003) contradict the efficient market rational expectations model, which implies that the majority of changes in exchange rates occurs when there is no observable news in the fundamentals. Other anomalies relate to the existence of excess volatility, fat tails of the distribution of exchange rate returns and volatility clustering (Flood and Rose, 1995; de Vries, 2001; Lux and Marchesi, 2000) .
Guided by this evidence, which was difficult to rationalize in existing exchange rate models, three different modeling approaches of the exchange rate have emerged. The first one uses the Obstfeld-Rogoff (1995 , 1996 REDUX framework of dynamic utility optimization of a representative agent. These micro-founded macro models assume rational expectations, but are more thorough in the micro foundation compared to the former exchange rate models. A second approach highlights the importance of the market microstructure theory in explaining the complex short-term behavior of the exchange rate (Evans and Lyons, 2002) . Using order flow as a proximate determinant, they develop a model that is strikingly successful in accounting for realized exchange rate changes. In their analyses, they show that the order flow conveys dispersed information and that the distribution of information is an important determinant in short-run exchange rate movements. Moreover, the large volumes in the exchange rate market are explanatory for short-term movements and an indication that agents have different information or process information differently.
As shown by Fan and Lyons (2001) , informative trades are mixed with uninformative trades, indicating that market efficiency crucially depends on how markets accomplish the difficult task of aggregating dispersed information. Finally, a third approach recognizes that heterogeneous agents have different and changing beliefs about the behavior of the exchange rate, thereby introducing non-linear features in the dynamics of the exchange rate. This approach was initiated by Frankel and Froot (1987) and further developed in the context of financial asset pricing. For instance, Hommes (1997, 1998 ) model trader-heterogeneity in a dynamic heterogeneous agents model with trader interaction and switching believes. Their approach differs from the fundamental models in that it explicitly models different types of boundedly rational behavior.
The third insight highlights the role of the heterogeneity of economic agents' expectations and seems promising in explaining the dynamics of asset prices, including the exchange rate (see de Long et al., 1990; Frankel and Froot, 1987; Brock and Hommes, 1998; Lux and Marchesi, 2000; Hommes, 2000) . For instance, heterogeneous agent models are able to replicate the characteristics of exchange rate returns; volatility clustering, fat tails of the distribution of returns and the absence of first-moment predictability and long-run mean reversion are replicated by Grimaldi (2005, 2006) . Verification of the heterogeneous agent models, however, has only been done by either simulations or analytical derivations -both methods are elaborately presented in De Grauwe et al. (2004) . The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to study the mechanics of the model in a purely deterministic way; it gives a clear view on the effect of the mechanisms in the model. The disadvantage, however, is that the model is not directly confronted with real-life financial data. It is therefore not certain whether the mechanisms formally described in the heterogeneous agent models are actually present in the dynamics of financial markets, despite the fact that the models are capable of reproducing the characteristics observed in exchange markets.
Although the heterogeneity of agents approach is intellectually satisfying, the heterogeneity model has hardly been estimated with empirical financial data because of the non-linear nature of the model that (mainly) arises from the existence of the mechanism that governs the switching between beliefs. Recently this issue has been explored either directly or indirectly by a number of papers. As an early example, Shiller (1984) introduces a model with rational smart money traders and ordinary investors and shows that the proportion of smart money traders varies considerably during the 1900-1983 period by assuming the effect of ordinary investors to be zero. Vigfusson (1997) and Ahrens and Reitz (2005) have circumvented the problem of the non-linear switching mechanism by replacing it by a Markov regime-switching approach. Baak (1999) and Chavas (2000) find significant evidence of agent heterogeneity in the beef market by applying a Kalman-filter approach. Winker and Gilli (2001) estimate a heterogeneous agent model indirectly by minimizing a loss function consisting of the kurtosis and ARCH-estimates of the simulated data by adjusting the coefficients of the model. Westerhoff (2003, 2006) estimate a model of chartists and fundamentalists with switching mechanism for exchange rates by assuming the weight of technical traders to be constant and the weight of fundamental traders to depend on the misalignment between the market and fundamental price. Boswijk et al. (2006) is the only example, to our best knowledge, that fully and directly estimates a heterogeneous agents model with switching mechanism; they simplify and rewrite the model of Brock and Hommes (1997) and estimate it for the S&P500. Overall, the majority of the empirical studies finds evidence in favor of the heterogeneous agents models; both trader heterogeneity and switching believes are found.
This paper explores the relevance of the heterogeneity of agents' expectations, who use incomplete information and who have different beliefs about the future exchange rate. Our approach uses simple expectation formation rules, which form the asset price forming mechanism. The "fitness" of the rules is controlled ex-post by checking their risk-adjusted profitability; agents can switch to the more profitable rule. We extend the analyses of Boswijk et al. (2006) by estimating the heterogeneous agent model of De Grimaldi (2005, 2006) for the European Monetary System (EMS) exchange rates. Unlike previous foreign exchange rate studies, we avoid the problems of defining the 'true' fundamental exchange rate, on which there is no consensus in the literature and which may also change over time during a floating rate period (Manzan and Westerhoff, 2005) . By using the central 'parity' rate as the fundamental rate, we estimate the model for the EMS-period, from March 1979 until December 1998. The EMS was literally an exchange rate target zone with narrow bands, such that there are movements in the exchange rate 2 , but still we have an observable "fundamental."
2 Unlike the case of a fixed rate regime.
-5 -Note that the intuition behind the heterogeneity model changes somewhat.
3
Mean reversion does not necessarily have to be interpreted as fundamentalism, but as confidence in the target zone regime. 4 True fundamentalists can also expect the exchange rate to move away from parity if they believe the central rate is not accurate and the exchange rate will move towards the actual economics based fundamental rate as perceived by traders. In this paper, we simply define fundamentalists as agents who condition their expectations on the central parity, irrespective of whether they are stabilizing or destabilizing for the target zone regime. Chartists, or technical analysts, in contrast, base their expectation on past returns. Furthermore, the behavior of market participants can be dependent on the position of the market rate in the band, comparable to the S-curve of Krugman (1991) . Initially destabilizing chartists who believe the regime is credible might become stabilizing or revise their coefficients as the exchange rate gets close to the upper or lower band. In addition, the fundamentalists' expectation of mean-reversion might get stronger as the exchange rate moves closer to the band if they expect Central Bank interventions. Thus, mean reversion can be stronger if the expected gain is larger, so if the exchange rate is close to the band and the regime is credible, and vice versa.
The current study complements previous studies and makes several new contributions. Using a sample of eight EMS exchange rates for the period from March 1979 to December 1998, we find strong evidence in favor of the heterogeneous agent model. For seven countries, we find significant evidence of heterogeneous expectations; significant switching of believes is found for only two countries, but switching is significantly beneficial for the explanatory power of the model in seven
cases. In addition, we show that the heterogeneous agent model outperforms the random walk in out-of-sample forecasting in all country/period combinations. Finally, we find that the limit behavior of the model for the total sample is generally stable, while it differs considerably per country and period for sub samples.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the three building blocks of the heterogeneous agent model, while Section 2 presents the methodology to empirically estimate the model. In Section 3 the estimation results are reported. In addition, Section 4 presents the forecasting ability of the model. Section 5
3 An important feature of fixed exchange rate regimes is that parities are usually imperfectly credible and not permanent. 4 The EMS exchange rate mechanism could very well lead to mean reversion in bilateral EMS exchange rates if the system succeeds in maintaining longer-run targets rates or central rates.
discusses the deterministic behavior of our model, in particular the stability and type of limit behavior if we iterate the model forward. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
The model
In this Section, we use a simple non-linear model of the exchange rate, which is very close to the approach proposed by Grimaldi (2005, 2006) . They model the exchange rate as a financial asset, while using the macro-economic fundamentals as an exogenous variable. The model consists of three building blocks.
First agents decide on the optimal portfolio in a mean variance utility framework using simple expectations formation rules concerning the future exchange rate.
Second, the actual exchange rate is formed by the weighted average of heterogeneous expectations and, third, the simple rules are evaluated ex-post by comparing their riskadjusted profitability. The following step consists of choosing a forecasting rule for the next cycle, based on past performance. We assume different types of agents, which we will call fundamentalists and chartists. 
The investment decision
We assume agents of different types i depending on their beliefs about the future exchange rate. Each agent of type i can invest in two assets, a domestic and a foreign one, and maximizes mean-variance utility given by the following equation:
5 Note that the chartists do not take into account information concerning the fundamental exchange rate and can be considered as pure noise traders (see De Long et al., 1990) . For evidence that Chartism is used widely to make forecasts see Cheung et al., 1999 and Taylor and Allen, 1992 . Neely and Weller (1999 show that this is also the case for the EMS period. Total market demand for foreign assets at time t is equal to the sum of individual demands, i.e.:
where H is the number of different forecasting strategies, n i,t is the number of agents of type i in period t and D t is total demand for the foreign asset. Market equilibrium implies that market demand is equal to market supply X t , which we assume to be exogenous. Thus,
where X t is the exogenous supply of foreign assets. For simplicity we assume the supply of foreign assets exogenous and constant; without loss of generality we can put X t =0.
Substituting the optimal holdings into the market demand and then into the market equilibrium equation and solving for the exchange rate s t yields the market clearing exchange rate:
where
is the weight of agent of type i. Note that the current exchange rate is a function of expected future exchange rates. A way of interpreting this is that there is a Walrasian auctioneer; investors trade using market orders. At the beginning of the period, they choose their optimal demand of the risky asset to submit to the market maker. At the end of period t, the market maker fixes the equilibrium exchange rate s t that clears the market. The exchange rate is therefore always in equilibrium.
Which strategy?
The next step in our analysis is to specify how agents evaluate the fitness of the strategy they are using. We assume that agents use one of three rules, compare their (risk adjusted) profitability ex-post and then decide whether to keep the rule or switch to another one. Note that this is a boundedly rational setup. The model represents a complex non-linear world, such that expectations cannot be unbiased without infinitely accurate estimates of the coefficients and starting values of the model. The bounded rationality therefore does not come forward in non-accurate expectations, but lies in the fact that agents do not use all available information in forming expectations, while they do have costless access to that information. For example, agents know the expectations formed by both strategies because they compare profits. However, they do not take into account the existence of other agents when forming expectations, thus do not use all available information. The bounded rationality also shows from the fact that not all agents change strategy immediately once a certain strategy performs better than the other does in a given period. The number of agents using a given strategy evolves gradually over time, conditional on relative performance. On the other hand, agents do condition the choice of their expectation rule on past performance, which is relevant for maximizing utility. In This specification is more appropriate than the representative rational agent model since the hypothesis of rationality is rejected in all tests on survey expectations (see e.g. Cavaglia et al., 1993) . Furthermore, introducing mutual conditioning in expectation formation creates the phenomenon of "infinite regress" (Townsend, 1983) , i.e. the exchange rate depends on the expectations of other agents' expectations, which depends on the expectations of the expectations of other agents' expectations, and so on, ad infinitum. This leads to intractable mathematical problems except under very restrictive simplifying assumptions.
We use the concept of a switching mechanism as proposed by Brock and Hommes (1997) based on a multinomial logit setup. Such a mechanism consists of making the weights of the simple rules a function of the relative profitability of these rules, i.e.:
which yields, after rewriting
where w i,t is the fraction of agents of type i in period t and i,t is the profit of strategy i.
The parameter measures the intensity of choice, the speed with which the technical traders (chartists) and fundamentalists revise their forecasting rules. This parameter measures the "status-quo bias" in the decision to switch to the more profitable rule (Kahneman et al., 1991) ; with equal to zero agents are insensitive to the relative profitability of the rules, and are distributed evenly across strategies. On the other hand, with increasing agents react more strongly to the relative profitability of the rules. In the limiting neo-classical case when goes to infinity all agents react immediately to a difference in profitability, i.e. all choose the forecasting rule which proved to be more profitable in the previous period. Brock and Hommes (1997) define profitability to be the total earnings (profits) on the optimal foreign asset holding. We define the profitability as the one-period excess return from investing in the foreign asset, multiplied by the optimal demand for the foreign asset. More formally,
We have chosen for this setup because it is the most appropriate alternative. If we use utility instead of return, the performance is dependent on wealth. This is undesirable because traders are interested in the contemporaneous forecasting power of rules, not on past performance. Using only the one-period return is also less appropriate since this setup does not incorporate absolute differences in the magnitude of expectations, only the expected directions of change.
The forecasting strategies
The functional form of the expectation formation rules can be adapted such that it fits the data best. The problem is that agents can use an infinite number of different rules; rationality can only take one form while bounded rationality can take infinitely different forms. The switching mechanism, however, works as a disciplining mechanism of the model; it prevents the modeler from inserting unrealistic forecasting strategies or strategies that are not being used. The weight of these strategies would go to zero, as the rules are not actually being used. Several different forms of expectations formation mechanisms have been uncovered over the years. In short, the expectation formation process can take different functional forms, depending on forecast horizon, sample period, and foreign exchange markets (see Allen and Taylor, 1992; Boswijk et al., (2006); Cavaglia et al., 1993; Frankel and Froot, 1987) . We assume that there are three types of agents: Fundamentalists who condition their expectation on a comparison between the market and the fundamental rate and two chartists (technical traders) groups who condition their expectation on past exchange rate movements.
The fundamentalists condition their expectation on the difference between the market exchange rate and the central parity. Thus, the forecasting rule for the fundamentalists is
where s t * is the fundamental exchange rate in period t-1 and k ψ the speed of adjustment parameter. 7, 8 This is a generalization of the fundamentalist rule proposed in De Grimaldi (2005, 2006) ; they assume
fundamentalists provide a mean reverting dynamics. We do not assume this because it is unknown on forehand what the effect of fundamentalists will be in our market.
7 Note that the expected future return depends on the previous misalignment and is not dependent on the current misalignment. The current exchange rate is formed by expectations of the future exchange rate, as comes clear from Equation 6. Therefore, the expected exchange rate cannot be a function of the current exchange rate, because this would render the equation unsolvable. 8 De Grimaldi (2005, 2006) introduce information costs in the expectation formation for fundamentalists. However, because our "fundamental", the parity, is freely visible for all agents, we assume these costs to be zero.
Empirical evidence suggests that exchange rates are mean reverting in the long run (see e.g. Mark, 1995) . Therefore, agents have the opportunity to condition expectations on a high(er) number of lags.
The second group of agents in our model is technical analyst or chartist, using the serial correlation in the returns. Their forecasting rule is specified as
where the chartists' expectation depends on the value of the parameter . With -1< < 0 chartist expectations are stabilizing because agents expect a (partial) reversion of previous periods return. If > 0 on the other hand, chartists have bandwagon expectations pushing the exchange rate constantly in a certain direction.
The first two groups are similar to those defined in De Grimaldi (2005, 2006) ; this is standard in the literature. We introduce a third group in order to generalize the model. The third group also uses a chartist strategy, based on the difference between the short term and long term moving average. Brock et al. (1992) introduces this strategy and demonstrate its relevance in financial markets; see also Chiarella et al. (2006) for the deterministic behavior of this rule in a heterogeneous agents setting. The forecasting rule is given by
where MA i,t and MA j,t are the i and j months moving average of the level of the exchange rate, i > j. The strategy works destabilizing if k > 0 as agents expect short run deviations from the long-term trend to persist; if k < 0 the rule is stabilizing as agents expect the exchange rate to return to its long run moving average.
The empirical estimation of the model
The heterogeneous agent model described in Section 1 needs some adjustments before it can be estimated empirically. Furthermore, the target-zone character of our data sample demands some further adjustments to the model. For all three strategies, we assume that agents run a simple regression in order to obtain the optimal lags, in the sense of forecasting ability, for the misalignment, auto regressions, and moving averages. 10 Because we want to verify whether the strategy of agents is conditional on the position of the exchange rate in the target zone, we add the absolute misalignment times the decision variable to the expectation formation functions in Equations (10)-(12). We can write the forecasting rule for the fundamentalists as follows: . The second part of the second term on the right hand side thus 9 The Haussman test indicates a highly significant endogeneity problem and the correlation between the misalignment and the residuals is significant. 10 Agents are assumed to use two different lags. See the appendix for the optimal lag structure used by the agents. 
and the MA-chartist forecasting rule becomes ( )
Equations (6), (8) and (9) together with the functional forms of the expectation formation mechanisms described in equations (13)- (15) can be combined to a single equation-framework and be estimated by non-linear least squares.
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Our database contains monthly bilateral exchange rates for currencies of countries that became EMS member in March 1979. For a number of years, prior to the formal adherence to the EMS, the Spanish peseta was informally kept within a +/-6 percent band with respect to EMS currencies. The exchange rate data were obtained from Datastream. Even though daily and weekly rates are available, we choose to employ monthly data in order to avoid issues surrounding short-term noise such as the day-of-the-week effect with regard to exchange rate volatility (on which, see Hsieh, 1988 
Empirical results
Our first step consists of estimating the model without switching mechanism, so with constant fractions, such that the model becomes linear in the expectation formation functions of the three groups. The model simplifies to Equation (6), with w i,t =1/3 i ∀ , and the expectation formation functions in Equations (13), (14) and (15). The reason is that we first want to verify whether there is indeed significant evidence of heterogeneity on the foreign exchange market, before determining whether agents are switching between expectation formation techniques as well. Heterogeneity is defined as the contemporaneous presence of different expectation formation techniques in the market, i.e. one or more significant coefficients for more than one of the expectation formation Equations (13), (14) and ( Table 1 .
______________________
Insert Table 1 ______________________ Overall, Table 1 indicates that there is heterogeneity in the behavior of agents in the exchange rate market, given the contemporaneous significant existence of fundamentalism and one or two forms of chartism. The exchange rate returns are therefore affected by different beliefs concerning the future. Given the number of significant coefficients per group and the distribution over countries, the market seems to be dominated by fundamentalists and AR-chartists; MA-chartism is significant for only three countries in this setup. Furthermore, the general tendency seems to be for agents to be stabilizing, i.e. they expect either the exchange rate to return to the fundamental, the exchange rate to return to the long-run moving average, or past exchange rate returns to be reversed. Agents active on the market therefore seem to have a large amount of trust in the regime (the monetary authorities), as evidenced by the majority of negative coefficients.
For Italy, Portugal, and Spain, we observe evidence of all three groups given the one or more significant coefficients for all three expectation formation techniques;
for Belgium, Denmark, France and Ireland two groups (fundamentalism and ARchartism) and for The Netherlands one group (AR-chartism). Fundamentalists are in general confident in the system in the short run given the negative 1,k and/or 2,k coefficients. That is, either they are directly stabilizing as 1,k <0 and thus expect a misalignment to be partially reversed in the next period, or they become meanreverting as the exchange rate moves towards the band of the target zone, so as 1,k >0, 2,k <0 and | 1,k |<| 2,k |. In other words, in the latter case agents expect the exchange rate to move away from the fundamental as the exchange rate is relatively close to parity, but expect the monetary authority to intervene as the exchange rate approaches the band of the target zone causing the exchange rate to return towards the central parity. In the long run, on the other hand, the signs of the fundamentalist coefficients 1,l and 2,l are predominantly positive, and are thus destabilizing. Agents expect the exchange rate to move away from the central parity in the long run ( 1,l >0) and do not expect the monetary authority to intervene, but expect the motion away from the central parity to accelerate as the band of the target zone approaches ( 2,l >0).
The MA-chartist group is generally stabilizing given the negative estimates for . A negative 1,i implies that agents expect a positive difference between the short run moving average and the long run moving average to decrease in the next period.
A negative 2,i implies that agents expect the difference between short-and long-run moving averages to decrease quicker as the exchange rate moves closer to the band of the target zone. Boswijk et al. (2006) use yearly stock-market data compared to our monthly exchange rate data; both the lower frequency data and the other market usually yield a better fit.
In the next step of the analysis, we estimate the model including the switching mechanism defined by Equations (8) and (9). Table 2 gives the estimation results for the setup of the model with switching mechanism for the eight EMS countries 15 .
_______________________
Insert Table 2 _______________________ 14 Boswijk et al. (2006) rewrite the model in terms of the current Price/Earnings (P/E) ratio in deviation from the fundamental P/E ratio. It is assumed that both groups base their expectation on this deviation, while in our model expectations are based on different sources of information (i.e., deviation from the fundamental, AR-terms and MA-terms Generally, the signs and magnitudes of the , and coefficients in Table 2 are comparable to the no-switching case in Table 1 . Large, but not significant, changes only occur in cases in which the estimates are non-significant. In total, ten more coefficients are significant in the switching case compared to the non-switching setup. The expectation formation rules therefore fit the data better when the weight put on these rules is not constant through time. 16 Note that is not identified in the estimation. Focusing on the denominator of Equation (8), Or that and are both negative. However, a negative risk aversion is highly unlikely. 18 The switching parameter is usually set around one in simulations (De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006) . 's are higher in seven cases; likelihood ratio tests indicate that these differences are significant. The results indicate that the linearity assumption, i.e. constant fractions, is too rigid and that the switching mechanism is indeed beneficial in explaining movements in the returns. The switching of agents between strategies is therefore present in the data. This shows not only from the higher R 2 , but also from the higher number of significant coefficients. In other words, although we do not find significant estimates for Furthermore, none of the strategies is dominant for long periods on end. We do observe, however, persistence in the distribution of weights; beliefs do not bounce up and down per month, but change gradually. This is also the result of the relatively high status quo bias. Grimaldi (2005, 2006) are therefore partly corroborated. Allen and Taylor (1992) report that over 90% of foreign exchange market traders use some form of technical analysis. We do not find such strong chartist dominance.
_____________________
Insert Figure 2 
The effect of the intensity of choice parameter * is again clearly illustrated in Figure 2 , where we present scatter plots of profit difference versus weight difference.
In all scatters we observe that the higher the estimated * , the stronger is the S-shape.
A strong S-shape implies that the distribution of beliefs (Y-axis) changes rapidly as the profit difference diverges from zero (X-axis); traders are thus more sensitive to profit differences. As * approaches zero, the scatter first becomes a straight sloping line, then a straight flat line; agents respond sluggish to a difference in performance.
The scatters are in general downward sloping, indicating that a positive difference in profits between strategies results in a negative difference in weights. In other words, agents move away from a strategy that is profitable in period t because it is apparently less profitable in period t+1; this results from the positive estimate of * .
Forecasting power
Next to the in-sample performance of a model, the ability of a model to forecast exchange rates out-of-sample is considered an important criterion of its quality. The most famous example is of course Meese and Rogoff (1983) , who showed that the news models from the 1970s performed worse than a simple random walk in terms of root-mean-squared forecasting error. To our best knowledge, only Clarida and Taylor (1997) and Mark (1995) have come up with a model that is able to outperform the random walk in out-of-sample forecasting during a floating rate regime. Mark (1995) shows that the exchange rate is mean-reverting to a monetary-model based fundamental by applying long-horizon regressions; Clarida and Taylor (1997) In order to verify the forecasting power of our model, we employ an alternative method compared to the papers stated above. Common practice is to apply a rolling regression technique, so to first estimate the model for a sub-sample, second create forecasts, third re-estimate the model with one extra observation, etc. We do not apply a rolling regression technique, but use the set of coefficients estimated over the total sample for all forecasts, with which dynamic forecasts are made by iterating the model forward for the appropriate number of periods. The reason is twofold; first,
given the non-linear nature, the behavior of the model, and thereby the forecasts, is highly dependent on the magnitude of the coefficients (see Chiarella et al., 2002) .
Therefore, if we are interested in explaining movements in the market, it is essential to incorporate the coefficients representative for the market at hand. This is especially the case for the EMS because of the changing nature of the regime itself (realignments in the beginning years, stable middle period, and the crisis in the final years). Second, the model uses a relatively high number of coefficients, thus needs a relatively long sample period to be estimated properly.
Our method of forecasting demands more information concerning the coefficients, but uses less information regarding the variables compared to e.g. Meese and Rogoff (1983) and Mark (1995) . In forecasting, we assume that the level of the fundamental (central parity), the bandwidth of the target zone, the interest rates, and the volatility remain constant, while Meese and Rogoff (1983) and Mark (1995) use future fundamental variables to generate forecasts. Our model thus does not use more information than the random walk model in this respect. Another advantage of our method is that forecasts can be formed over the complete sample, including the volatile beginning years of the EMS. This is not possible when applying the rolling regression technique because it needs a sufficiently large sub-sample in order to estimate the first set of coefficients. The comparison of forecasting ability between the random walk and heterogeneous agents model is therefore based on a larger number of observations when using our method, and can therefore be tested more rigorously.
The forecasting ability of the model is judged by comparing the mean absolute error (MAE) and mean squared error (MSE) of the forecasts formed by the heterogeneous agents model to those of the random walk model (i.e., no change). The significance of the difference in forecasting ability is tested by the Dybold and Mariano (1994) test statistic. The rectangular lag window is applied; with k-1 sample autocovariances for the k step ahead forecast error. We focus on the 1, 3, 6, and 12-month forecast horizon for the eight countries. Table 3 presents the forecast errors made by the model divided by the forecast errors made by the random walk for the four forecast horizons and eight countries.
______________________
Insert Table 3 ______________________ Overall, the results suggest that the heterogeneous agents model outperforms the random walk model in forecasting for all horizons; for the majority of countries both the MAE and MSE are smaller for our model than the random walk given the fact that the ratios in Table 3 are smaller than unity. Furthermore, the difference in forecasting ability is generally highly significant; only for Italy and the longer horizons of Spain is the significance somewhat less.
For both the MAE and MSE we observe that the forecasting power of the model vis-à-vis the random walk generally improves as the forecasting horizon increases up to six months, while it decreases again for the twelve months horizon; the ratios for the three (six) months horizon are smaller than the one (three) months horizon, and larger for the twelve months horizon than the six months horizon. This can be explained by the fact that the mean reversion of the exchange rate to the central parity creates a growing forecast error for the random walk as the forecast horizon increases, while it is incorporated in the heterogeneous agents model by the stabilizing expectations of the three groups. The change in this trend for the twelve months horizon could be due to the fact that realignments in the central parity are not 
Stability
The literature on heterogeneous agents models has been concerned with two main objectives. First, to try to replicate the stylized facts of financial markets such as heavy tails, volatility clustering, excess kurtosis by simulation techniques, see e.g. De Grimaldi (2005, 2006) , Lux (1998) , Lux and Marchesi (2000) . The second objective is to derive analytically the deterministic behavior in terms of local stability or instability of the nonlinear dynamic models involved, see De Grauwe et al. (2004) , Chiarella and He (2002), and Chiarella et al. (2002) .
In this Section, we study the deterministic behavior of our model. More specifically, we investigate the stability and type of limit behavior of the model if we iterate the model forward, using the estimated set of coefficients. Figure 3 displays the limit behavior of the model for seven countries 21 , after iterating the model forward until convergence using the estimated coefficients for the total sample period.
_______________________
Insert Figure 3 
The majority of the countries converges to either a stable point or a stable limit cycle. Economically this implies that the target zone does not collapse, even without active central bank policy 22 ; exchange rates do not diverge from the parity rate. The mean-reverting effect of the expectation formation strategies keeps the exchange rate within bands. The monetary authorities have shaped expectations in such a way in the 1974-1998 period such that the market controls itself afterwards.
The model converges to a stable equilibrium for France, given that the model converges to a fixed point. The exchange rate returns for Denmark, Portugal, and
Spain are not on a sustainable path, the returns explode after forward iteration. Spain explodes within a small number of periods, but for Portugal and Denmark we see a relatively calm beginning, followed by one extreme negative for Portugal and followed by an explosive oscillative pattern for Denmark. For Spain and Portugal, 21 The eighth country, Spain, explodes after two iterations 22 Influence of the monetary authority is zero in the simulation; both parity and band remain constant and there are no interventions.
-25 -this can be explained by the relative short in-sample period and the volatile exchange rate. For Denmark, however, with a stable exchange rate, the explosive behavior is completely the result of the nonlinear nature of the model; the explosive oscillations can occur as AR-chartists become dominant. The Belgian exchange rate becomes a two-period limit cycle; the Dutch exchange rate becomes a 19-period limit cycle; the Italian a 21-period cycle, and Ireland a 89 months cycle.
De Grimaldi (2005, 2006) present the sensitivity of the model to different coefficients. Especially the intensity of choice and the extrapolation parameter of AR-chartists appear to be of great importance for the limit behavior of their model. We corroborate their findings given the fact that the countries that exhibit explosive behavior all have relatively high (absolute) estimates for the ARchartist extrapolation parameters ; a value of | |>1 is explosive by definition.
Given that the exchange rates in the EMS show different periods, like the turbulent beginning years characterized by a high number of realignments; the stable middle part, and the turmoil in 1992 and 1993, it is interesting to look at the limit behavior of the model in sub samples, so using sets of coefficients estimated from sub samples. For this purpose, we estimate the model for a rolling window of one hundred observations 23 , and check whether the limit behavior of the model for a certain country changes over time.
The characterizations of the limit cycles of the sub samples are presented in Table A1 of the Appendix. The stability of the deterministic system follows more or less the stability of the EMS itself. In the beginning years, we find a relatively high number of non-stable limits, so either explosive limits or highly complex cycles. The middle years of the EMS give a relatively high number of stable limit cycles and fixed points attractors. Around the 1992/1993 crisis, the number of unstable and explosive limits rises again. The changing limit behavior is an indication that expectation formation and investor behavior is not constant through time. to the coefficients as is done in Grimaldi (2005, 2006) . Outcomes of the model can differ significantly in reaction to a similar exogenous shock when coefficients are marginally different. Furthermore, even though the model produces a stable limit in most cases, this does not mean that this limit is reached in the same number of periods. As also comes clear from Figure 4 , stability can be reached after a positive or negative swing, or stabilizing oscillations; in some occasions, it took the model more than ten thousands periods to converge to a stable equilibrium. Therefore, even if a number of sets of coefficients give a similar limit, short term dynamics can differ dramatically.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we explored the relevance of the heterogeneity of agents' expectations, who use incomplete information and who have different beliefs about the future exchange rate. In particular, we extend the analyses of Boswijk et al. (2006) by estimating the heterogeneous agent model of De Grimaldi (2005, 2006) for the European Monetary System (EMS) exchange rates. By using the central 'parity' rate as the fundamental rate, we estimate the model for the EMS-period, from BF  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  12  2  2  10  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  F  2  2  2  2  2  F  2  2 
Notes: Table A2 characterizes the limit behavior of the model with the estimated coefficients for the given sub-periods. The numbers denote the number of points of the limit cycle; F denotes a fixed-point attractor; C denotes complex behavior (i.e. non-stable, non-explosive behavior); and E denotes explosive behavior. (6), (13), (14) and (15). The 's represent the coefficients for fundamentalism; for MA-chartism and for AR-chartism. Subscripts 1 and 2 indicate the direct and position dependent effect, respectively; k and l represent the optimal lags (see the Appendix). Standard errors are given in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote rejection at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. R 2 is the adjusted rsquared. Be denotes Belgium; De Denmark; Fr France; Nl Netherlands; It Italy; Ir Ireland; Po Portugal and Sp Spain. (6), (13), (14) and (15). The 's represent the coefficients for fundamentalism; for MA-chartism and for AR-chartism. * = / represents the switching parameter. Subscripts 1 and 2 indicate the direct and position dependent effect, respectively; k and l represent the optimal lags (see the Appendix). Standard errors are given in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote rejection at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. R 2 is the adjusted r-squared. Be denotes Belgium; De Denmark; Fr France; Nl Netherlands; It Italy; Ir Ireland; Po Portugal and Sp Spain. Netherlands (1) Netherlands (2) Italy (1) Italy ( Notes: Figure 5 depicts simulations of the model for seven countries (Spain explodes within two periods), using the coefficients as they are estimated for the total sample. The second plots for Netherlands, Italy, and Ireland are close-ups of the limit behavior.
